The Council adopts the below purpose and need statement and revised alternatives for initial review in April, anticipating the selection of a preliminary preferred alternative in April.

Problem statement:

Magnuson-Stevens Act National Standards require balancing optimum yield with minimizing bycatch and minimizing adverse impacts to fishery dependent communities. Chinook salmon bycatch taken incidentally in GOA pollock fisheries is a concern, historically accounting for the greatest proportion of Chinook salmon taken in GOA groundfish fisheries. Salmon bycatch control measures have not yet been implemented in the GOA, and 2010 Chinook salmon bycatch levels in the area were unacceptably high. Limited information on the origin of Chinook salmon in the GOA indicates that stocks of Asian, Alaska, British Columbia, and lower-48 origin are present, including ESA-listed stocks.

The Council is considering several management tools for the GOA pollock fishery, including a hard cap and cooperative approaches with improved monitoring and sampling opportunities to achieve Chinook salmon prohibited species catch (PSC) reductions. Management measures are necessary to provide immediate incentive for the GOA pollock fleet to be responsive to the Council’s objective to reduce Chinook salmon PSC.

Alternatives:

Alternative 1: Status quo.

Alternative 2: Chinook salmon PSC limit and increased monitoring.

Component 1: PSC limit: 15,000, 22,500, or 30,000 Chinook salmon PSC limit.

The PSC limit may be exceeded by up to 25 percent one out of three consecutive years. If the PSC limit is exceeded in one year, it may not be exceeded for the next two consecutive years.

Apportion limit between Central and Western GOA

a) proportional to the historical pollock TAC (2006-2010 or 2001-2010 average).

b) proportional to historical average bycatch number of Chinook salmon (2006-2010 or 2001-2010 average).

Option: drop 2007 and 2010 from both regulatory time series.

c) as a combination of options (a) and (b) at a ratio of a:b equal to

Suboption i: 25:75
Suboption ii: 50:50
Suboption iii: 75:25

Central and Western GOA PSC limits and the 25 percent buffer would be managed by area (measures to prevent or respond to an overage would be applied at the area level, not Gulf-wide).

Chinook salmon PSC limits shall be managed by NMFS in-season similar to halibut PSC limits.
If a Chinook salmon PSC limit is implemented midyear in the year of implementation, an amount should be deducted from the annual PSC limit in that year. The deduction should be equal to the contribution that would have been made based on historical averages (selected above) in the seasons preceding implementation.

Component 2: Expanded observer coverage:

Extend existing 30% observer coverage requirements for vessels 60'-125’ to trawl vessels less than 60’ directed fishing for pollock in the Central or Western GOA.

Alternative 3: Mandatory salmon bycatch control cooperative membership.

To be eligible to participate in the Central Gulf of Alaska or Western Gulf of Alaska pollock fishery, the holder of an appropriately endorsed License Limitation Program license would be required to join a Chinook salmon bycatch control cooperative.

Each cooperative would be formed for participation in a single regulatory area (e.g., Central Gulf of Alaska or Western Gulf of Alaska).

To form, a cooperative is required to have more than:

a) 25 percent; or
b) 33 percent;

of the licenses that participated in the applicable regulatory area in the preceding year.

Any cooperative is required to accept as a member any eligible person, subject to the same terms and conditions that apply to all other cooperative members. In addition, the cooperative agreement shall not disadvantage any eligible person entering the fishery for not having an established Chinook salmon bycatch history in the fishery.

Each cooperative agreement shall contain:

A requirement that all vessels retain all salmon bycatch until the plant observers have an opportunity to determine the number of salmon and collect scientific data and biological samples.

Vessel reporting requirements to be used to identify salmon hotspots and an appropriate set of measures to limit fishing in identified hotspots.

A system of information sharing intended to provide vessels with timely information concerning Chinook salmon bycatch rates.

A monitoring program to:

- ensure compliance with the full retention requirement,
- catalogue gear use and fishing practices and their effects on Chinook bycatch rates,
- ensure compliance with vessel reporting requirements and limits on fishing under the system of salmon hotspots,
- determine compliance with any measures that require use of fishing gear or practices to avoid Chinook salmon PSC, and
- verify vessel performance and implement any system of rewards and penalties related to vessel performance.

A set of contractual penalties for failure to comply with any cooperative requirements.
Cooperative agreements may also contain the following measures:

Measures to promote gear innovations and the use of gear and fishing practices that contribute to Chinook salmon avoidance.

A system of vessel performance standards that creates individual incentives for Chinook salmon avoidance, which could include rewards or penalties based on Chinook salmon bycatch.

Cooperatives may have no measures except those specifically authorized by this action (and shall not include any measures that directly allocate access to any portion of the total allowable catch or any PSC limit).

Each cooperative shall annually provide a report to the Council that includes the cooperative agreement and describes the cooperative’s compliance with the specific requirements for cooperatives and the cooperative’s performance with respect to those requirements (including salmon retention, gear innovations and fishing practices, vessel reporting requirements and hotspot identification and fishing limitations, vessel performance standards, information sharing, and monitoring). Cooperative reports shall also document any rewards or penalties related to vessel performance and any penalties for failure to comply with the cooperative agreement. The cooperative report should also describe the Chinook salmon bycatch seasonally, identifying any notable Chinook salmon bycatch occurrences or circumstances in the fishery. As a part of its report, a cooperative shall describe each measure adopted by the cooperative, the rationale for the measure (specifically describing how a measure is intended to serve the objective of addressing Chinook salmon PSC, while ensuring a fair opportunity to all participants in the fishery), and the effects of the measure.

In the event more than one cooperative is created within a regulatory area, those cooperatives will be required to enter an intercooperative agreement prior to beginning fishing. The intercooperative agreement will establish rules to ensure that no cooperative (or its members) are disadvantaged in the fishery by its efforts to avoid Chinook salmon.

The parties to any intercooperative agreement shall annually provide a report to the Council including the intercooperative agreement and describing each measure in the agreement, the rationale for the measure (specifically describing how a measure is intended to serve the objective of addressing Chinook salmon PSC, while ensuring a fair opportunity to all participants in the fishery), and the effect of the measure.

The requirement for salmon PSC to be discarded at sea would not apply to directed GOA pollock fishing.

The Council intends to advance both a PSC limit and mandatory bycatch cooperatives as a preliminary preferred alternative and requests the agency begin scheduling to accommodate both alternatives as quickly as practicable.